.
3/1/14, "Putin's War in Crimea Could Soon Spread to Eastern Ukraine.
And nobody—not the U.S., not NATO—can stop him," The New Republic, Julia Joffe
"Vladimir Putin has asked the Federation Council—the upper chamber of
Russia's dummy parliament—to authorize the use of force not just in
Crimea, but "on Ukraine's territory until the socio-political situation
is normalized." And though American spies and the Washington Post
categorically ruled this out just days ago, this was not entirely
unexpected. The situation is changing rapidly, but here are some initial
thoughts.
Why is Putin doing this? Because he can. That's it,
that's all you need to know. The situation in Kiev—in which people
representing one half of the country (the Ukrainian-speaking west) took
power to some extent at the expense of the Russian-speaking east—created
the perfect opportunity for Moscow to divide and conquer. As soon as
the revolution in Kiev happened, there was an unhappy rumbling in the
Crimea, which has a large Russian population and is home to the Russian
Black Sea Fleet. It was a small rumbling, but just big enough for Russia
to exploit. And when such an opportunity presents itself, one would be
foolish not to take it, especially if one's name is Vladimir Putin.
We
didn't think Putin would do this. Why, exactly? This has often puzzled
me about Western analysis of Russia. It is often predicated on wholly
Western logic: surely, Russia won't invade [Georgia, Ukraine, whoever's
next] because war is costly and the Russian economy isn't doing well and
surely Putin doesn't want another hit to an already weak ruble; because
Russia doesn't need to conquer Crimea if Crimea is going to secede on
its own; Russia will not want to risk the geopolitical isolation, and
"what's really in it for Russia?"—stop. Russia, or, more accurately,
Putin, sees the world according to his own logic, and the logic goes
like this: it is better to be feared than loved, it is better to be
overly strong than to risk appearing weak, and Russia was, is, and will
be an empire with an eternal appetite for expansion. And it will gather
whatever spurious reasons it needs to insulate itself territorially from
what it still perceives to be a large and growing NATO threat. Trying
to harness Russia with our own logic just makes us miss Putin's next
steps.
Pessimism always wins. One of the reasons I left my
correspondent's post in Moscow was because Russia, despite all the foam
on the water, is ultimately a very boring place. Unfortunately, all you
really need to do to seem clairvoyant about the place is to be an utter
pessimist. Will Vladimir Putin allow the ostensibly liberal Dmitry
Medvedev to have a second term? Not a chance. There are protests in the
streets of Moscow. Will Putin crackdown? Yup. There's rumbling in the
Crimea, will Putin take advantage and take the Crimean peninsula? You
betcha. And you know why being a pessimist is the best way to predict
outcomes in Russia? Because Putin and those around him are,
fundamentally, terminal pessimists. They truly believe that there is an
American conspiracy afoot to topple Putin, that Russian liberals are
traitors corrupted by and loyal to the West, they truly believe that,
should free and fair elections be held in Russia, their countrymen would
elect bloodthirsty fascists, rather than democratic liberals. To a
large extent, Putin really believes that he is the one man standing
between Russia and the yawning void. Putin's Kremlin is dark and scary,
and, ultimately, very boring.
Remember the U.N.? Russia loves the
U.N. Anytime the U.S. or Europe want to do anything on the world stage,
Russia pipes up, demanding the issue be taken to the U.N. for the
inevitable Russian veto. As Steven Lee Meyers, Moscow correspondent for
the New York Times, pointed out, Russia does not seem to even remember
that the institution exists today. Ditto for all that talk of "political
solutions" and "diplomatic solutions" and "dialogue" we heard about in
Syria. In other words, what we are seeing today—Russia's unilateral
declaration of war—is the clearest statement yet of Russia's actual
position: Putin empathizes with Bashar al-Assad as a fellow leader
holding his country back from the brink and doing the dirty work that
needs to be done to accomplish that, and the U.N. is just a convenient
mechanism for keeping nay-sayers with large armies at bay.
As I
wrote earlier this month, Russia, like the U.S., projects its own
mindset onto the rest of the world. So when you hear Putin and his
foreign minister Sergei Lavrov and the talking heads on Russia Today
crowing about American cynicism and machinations, well, keep in mind
whom they're really talking about.
.
Speaking of America.
Today's meeting of the Federation Council was an incredible sight to
behold. Man after Soviet-looking man mounted the podium to deliver a
short diatribe against...you name it. Against Ukrainian fascism, against
Swedes, and, most of all, against America. One would think that it
wasn't the illegitimate government in Kiev occupying Russian
Crimea—which, lordy lord, if we're going to get ethnic, let's recall who
originally lived there—but the 82nd Airborne. The vice speaker of the
Council even demanded recalling the Russian ambassador to Washington.
America was amazingly, fantastically behind events in Kiev and proved
utterly inept at influencing them, and yet none of that seemed to
matter. America, the old foe, was everywhere, its fat capitalist fingers
in every Slavic pie. Watching the Federation Council, where few of the
speakers seemed to be under the age of 60, I couldn't escape the feeling
that this was an opportunity for Russia not just to take back some land
it's long considered its rightful own, but to settle all scores and to
tie up all loose ends. You know, while they're at it.
Double
standards. This is another howl you often hear rending the skies over
Moscow: Western double standards. But let's get real for a second. We've
spoken already about the U.N., but what about the holy Russian mantra
of non-interference in a nation's internal affairs? When it comes to
Syria, to take a most recent example, the fight between Assad and the
rebels is something only the Syrians can sort out. Ditto every other
country in the world—unless it's in Russia's backyard, where Russia
still experiences phantom limb syndrome. The internal issues of former
Soviet republics, you see, are not truly internal issues of sovereign
nations. This is because, by Stalin's very conscious design and very
deliberate border drawing and population movement, most former Soviet
republics are ethnic hodgepodges. So Ukraine has a sizable Russian
population. Ditto Estonia, ditto Georgia, ditto Kazakhstan. And,
according to Putin's unspoken doctrine, anywhere Russian citizens are
determined to be at risk, Mother Moscow can intercede with force on
their behalf.
.
In other, blunter words, Russian ethnicity
and citizenship trump national sovereignty. At the very least, they
provide a convenient pretext for territorial expansion, as they did in
South Ossetia and Abkhazia, where Russia was also ostensibly protecting
Russian citizens—also newly minted for the occasion. Just this week, for
instance, Russia introduced a law to make it easier for Ukrainians to
get Russian citizenship—you know, to give Russia someone to protect.
Russia
manufactured this crisis to create a pretext for a land-grab. There are
now protests swinging Russian flags and hailing Russia's glory not just
in Crimea but all over the Russian-speaking east of Ukraine. I was just
in Donetsk, Yanukovich's hometown, on Monday. It was calm, calmer than
calm. There were a couple dozen people guarding the Lenin statue in the
center of the city from vandals, but that was it. A muckety-muck in the
city's administration told me, "If they send new people in to replace
us, we'll leave peacefully, we won't try to hang on." The same was the
case in Simferopol, in Crimea. And then, out of nowhere, men with
unmarked uniforms were taking over government buildings and airports,
and huge demonstrations were pumping on town squares all over the
regions. The Kremlin often refers to "a well-organized informational
war" when their enemies broadcast something they don't like on repeat.
And now, looking at the alarmist, blanket coverage on Russian
television—now all loyal to the Kremlin—about fascists and radicals
staging a coup in Kiev, it's hard to think of a better term. This was
indeed a well-organized informational war.
Neither America nor
NATO can stop this. They've shown they won't in Georgia, because nobody
wants to start a war with nuclear-armed Russia, and rightly so. So while
Washington and Brussels huff and puff about lines and sovereignty and
diplomacy, Russia will do what it needs to do and there's not a thing we
can do about it.
Russia's next target is eastern Ukraine.
Because pessimism conquers all, don't bet that Putin is going to stop
once he wrests Crimea from Kiev's orbit. Eastern, Russian-speaking
Ukraine—and all its heavy industry—is looking pretty good right now. And
if you're thinking "Why would Putin take eastern Ukraine?," well, you
haven't been reading very carefully." via Free Republic
.
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