.
3/25/14, "Loud + Weak = War." Victor Davis Hanson, NRO
"China and Russia are no more impressed with empty bluster today than Japan was in 1941."
"The Roosevelt administration once talked loudly of pivoting to Asia to
thwart a rising Japan. As a token of its seriousness, in May 1940 it
moved the home port of the Seventh Fleet from San Diego to Pearl Harbor —
but without beefing up the fleet’s strength.
The
then-commander of the Pacific Fleet, Admiral James O. Richardson, an
expert on the Japanese Imperial Navy, protested vehemently over such a
reckless redeployment. He felt that the move might invite, but could not
guard against, surprise attack.
Richardson was eventually
relieved of his command and his career was ruined — even as he was later
proved right when Japan attacked Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941....
The common historical denominator is that Asia and the Pacific are
always dangerous places, where calling for tough action is not the same
as preparing for the consequences of upping the ante. Loud talk
sometimes even encourages a thuggish challenge to prove it.
Unless
the United States in any meaningful way backs up its current flamboyant
“pivot” to Asia with additional ships, air wings, and manpower, there
is no sense in chest-pounding our resolve to our increasingly orphaned
allies, who may soon have to choose between acquiescing to China and
going nuclear.
China will not be impressed that we talk
confidently even as we cut defense — just as imperial Japan was not awed
when aged American battleships were ordered westward to Pearl Harbor as
a gesture....
President Obama’s pivot has now joined his stable of deadlines, red
lines, step-over lines, and “I don’t bluff” and “I’m not kidding”
assertions. The problem with such rhetoric is not just that it is empty,
but that it is predictably empty. If Obama cannot lead, can he at least
keep quiet about it?
A Russia, China, North Korea, or Iran is not
just unimpressed but encouraged, seeing such sermonizing as an
assurance of nothing to follow. Obama’s threats are like a gambler’s
involuntary tic, which astute poker players read always as a forewarning
of a bluffed empty hand to follow.
A wiser course is to decide in
advance where the U.S. is capable of deterring aggression and where it
either has no interest in trying or has no power even if it wished to.
Then, once our security parameters are established, we should stay
largely quiet, consult our allies, keep troublemakers guessing about our
next move, and then use force if necessary to stop their aggressions.
The Japanese, Taiwanese, South Koreans, Filipinos, and Australians
are more likely to assume their democracies are safe when they see a
U.S. carrier that means business than when they hear the president or
his secretary of state lecture an aggressor about its unacceptable
19th-century behavior, the Third World about its homophobia, or the
world about the dangers of climate change.
Consider also Russia.
We forget that “reset” in 2009 was a loud Obama attempt to reverse the
Bush administration’s efforts to punish Russia for its aggression
against Georgia — a Russian gambit itself perhaps predicated on the
impression that the United States was bogged down in Afghanistan and
Iraq, and that the Bush administration had been weakened by the midterm
elections of 2006. Bush’s efforts to promote new missile-defense
initiatives with Poland and the Czech Republic, suspension of
nuclear-arms-limitation talks, curtailment of official communications
with Moscow, and bolder efforts to isolate Iran from Russian
interference were all intended to advise Moscow not to bully its
neighbors.
Yet Obama entered office declaring that it was the Bush
administration’s reaction to the Georgia aggression, and not the Russian
invasion itself, that had cooled U.S.–Russian relations. The result was
a red plastic reset button that presaged loud lectures about human
rights in Russia without any real, concrete follow-through.
Our
relationship with Russia is far worse now than during the Bush
administration. Vladimir Putin is not just not deterred — who would be,
after the U.S. fickleness in Libya, Egypt, and Syria, and in dealing
with Iran? — but quite eager in the Crimea and Ukraine to show the world
how to deflate American moralistic sermonizing. Putin believes that his
amoral show of power impresses others who admire not his strength — for
in truth he has little of it — but the simulation of strength that wins
him support at home and a sort of sick admiration abroad.
Being weak is sometimes dangerous. Being loud, self-righteous, and weak is always very dangerous indeed."
=====================
.
Subscribe to:
Post Comments (Atom)
No comments:
Post a Comment