9/11/14, "Islamists Are Not Our Friends," NY Times Op-Ed, Dennis Ross, 9/12 print ed.
"A new fault line has emerged in Middle Eastern politics, one that will have profound implications for America’s foreign policy in the region. This rift is not defined by those who support or oppose the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), or by conflict between Sunnis and Shiites and the proxy war between Saudi Arabia and Iran. It is characterized by a fundamental division between Islamists and non-Islamists.
On one side are the Islamists — both Sunni and Shiite. ISIS and the Muslim Brotherhood
represent the Sunni end of the spectrum, while the Islamic Republic of
Iran and its militias, including Hezbollah (in Lebanon and Syria) and
Asaib Ahl al-Haq (in Iraq), constitute the other. Many of these
Islamists are at war with one another, but they are also engaged in a
bitter struggle with non-Islamists to define the fundamental identity of
the region and its states. What the Islamists all have in common is
that they subordinate national identities to an Islamic identity.
To
be sure, not all are as extreme as ISIS, which seeks to obliterate
sovereign nations under the aegis of a caliphate. But the Muslim
Brotherhood is committed to the Umma, the larger Muslim community. One
reason behind the popular revolt against its rule in Egypt was that the
Brotherhood violated a basic principle of national identity: It was
Islamist before it was Egyptian.
Now,
President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi sees his country engaged in an
existential conflict with the Muslim Brotherhood. He is backed
financially by Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait. Mr.
Sisi also collaborates closely with Algeria, and has support from
Morocco and Jordan.
During
the recent conflict in the Gaza Strip, there were demonstrations
against Israel in Europe — but not in the Arab states. Unlike Turkey and
Qatar, which support the Muslim Brotherhood, the other Sunni states in
the region wanted to weaken Hamas, the Brotherhood’s Palestinian
wing.
Those states were alienated when Washington turned to Qatar and
Turkey
as possible mediators of a cease-fire in the recent conflict.
The
Arab Awakening of 2011 did not usher in an era of democracy, nor could
it. The institutions of civil society were too weak; the political
culture of winner-take-all too strong; sectarian differences too
powerful; and a belief in pluralism too inchoate. Instead, the awakening
produced political vacuums and a struggle over identity.
President
Obama is right to note the old order’s disappearance in the region and
the time it’s taking for a new one to emerge. The administration is
struggling to define an effective strategy — but the Islamist vs.
non-Islamist divide creates an opening.
The
non-Islamists include the traditional monarchies, authoritarian
governments in Egypt and Algeria, and secular reformers who may be small
in number but have not disappeared.
They do not include Bashar
al-Assad’s regime in Syria; he is completely dependent on Iran and
Hezbollah and
cannot make decisions without them.
Today,
the non-Islamists want to know that the United States supports them.
For America, that means not partnering with Iran against ISIS, though
both countries may avoid interfering with each other’s operations
against the insurgents in Iraq.
It
means actively competing with Iran in the rest of the region,
independently of whether an acceptable nuclear deal can be reached with
Tehran. It means recognizing that Egypt is an essential part of the
anti-Islamist coalition, and that American military aid should not be
withheld because of differences over Egypt’s domestic behavior.
America
should also coordinate with Egypt and the U.A.E. when they bomb
Islamist targets in Libya, or elsewhere. Coordination will make their
military operations more effective, as well as provide America with
greater ability to influence their actions. (And Washington would want
to be able to head off military acts that it sees as ill-advised.)
The
Obama administration worries about the consequences of excluding all
Islamists. It worries, too, about appearing to give a blank check to
authoritarian regimes, when it believes there need to be limits and that
these regimes are likely to prove unstable over time. But as Egypt and
the U.A.E. showed with the airstrikes on Islamists in Libya, some of
America’s traditional partners are ready to act without us, convinced
that the administration does not see all Islamists as a threat — and
that America sees its interests as different from theirs.
That is a
problem.
These
non-Islamists are America’s natural partners in the region. They favor
stability, the free flow of oil and gas, and they oppose terrorism. The
forces that threaten us also threaten them.
The Obama administration
needs to follow three principles in these partnerships.
First, focus on security and stability. Nothing, including tolerant, pluralist societies, is possible without it.
Second,
do not reach out to Islamists; their creed is not compatible with
pluralism or democracy. In Tunisia, the Ennahda party surrendered power
only when it realized its policies had produced such a backlash that the
party’s very survival was threatened. Islamists, even apparent
moderates like those of Ennahda [Tunisia], must be left with no choice but
coexistence.
Turkey
is a special case because it is a NATO ally. There is much we can do
with Turkey when it comes to fighting ISIS, but the Turkish president,
Recep Tayyip Erdogan, should understand that his support for the Muslim
Brotherhood limits what we will do with him and necessarily isolates
Turkey from its neighbors.
Third,
America’s support for non-Islamist partners does not require
surrendering our voice or supporting every domestic policy. We should
press them on pluralism, minority rights and the rule of law.
The
new fault line in the Middle East is a real opportunity for America.
Yes, the United States will face challenges and have to manage tensions
between our values and our interests. No strategy is free of risk, but
joining with our natural partners offers the best way forward."
"Dennis B. Ross,
a counselor and fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East
Policy, was the United States chief negotiator for the Arab-Israeli
conflict from 1993 to 2001 and a special assistant to the president for
the Middle East and South Asia from 2009 to 2011."
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Comment: Obama's expansive views on Islamists are shared by many in the political class including the GOP E.
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Comment: Obama's expansive views on Islamists are shared by many in the political class including the GOP E.
.
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