US State Dept. Document 9 (Oct. 25, 1993) and 10 (Oct. 22, 1993), scroll down. Despite $12 million US cash and US election experts on the ground in Russia, Yeltsin’s Nov. 1993 election results were “disastrous:” “U.S. backing remained constant after the disastrous election results in which Yeltsin’s party received only 15 percent of the vote and the Constitution barely passed the referendum. The system that emerged was essentially super-presidential, which did not worry most senior U.S. officials.”…“A Quarter Century after the Storming of the Russian White House,” By Svetlana Savranskaya, gwu.edu
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US State Dept. Document 9 (Oct. 25, 1993) and 10 (Oct. 22, 1993), scroll down
10/4/18, “Declassified Clinton-Yeltsin Telcons Show U.S. Support No Matter What, Embassy Cables and Oral Histories Detail Complex Conflict and U.S. Motivations, Today’s Russian Opposition Sees Crucial Turning Point Towards Today’s Autocracy,” National Security Archive, gwu.edu
“Twenty-five years ago last night in Moscow, Russian President Boris Yeltsin ordered tanks and airborne troops to shell and storm the “[Russian] White House,” the Russian Parliament (Supreme Soviet) building, to suppress the opposition trying to remove him.
Declassified documents published today by the National Security Archive include the transcript of U.S. President Bill Clinton’s phone call to Yeltsin the next day to praise him, the memcon in which U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher subsequently told Yeltsin this was “superb handling,” and two State Department cables painting a more complex portrait of the causes of the events.”…
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Document 9, Oct. 25 1993, US State Dept.: US Sec. of State tells Yeltsin’s Foreign Minister US will contribute $12 million US tax dollars to help Yeltsin with his upcoming Nov. 1993 election, will also provide monitors and observers. Document 10, Oct. 22, 1993, US Sec. of State Christopher meets with Yeltsin: “Christopher offers technical assistance for the election and notes that “there are already numbers of our experts here [in Russia] who could be helpful:”
“Document 09"
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1993-10-25 Source: U.S. Department of State. Date/Case ID: 11 MAR 2003 200001030
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“On his trip to Europe to explain the U.S. position on NATO expansion,
Secretary Christopher comes to Moscow after meetings in Budapest. He
and special ambassador Strobe Talbott meet with Foreign Minister Kozyrev and his deputy, Yuri Mamedov, before they visit Yeltsin at his country residence. [US Sec. of State] Christopher raises concerns about the fairness of the upcoming elections with his Russian counterparts. He mentions that the United States has $12 million to contribute and is willing to send monitors or observers,which Kozyrev welcomes, saying they might help to guard against fraud by communist-leaning local authorities in rural areas where “the old kolkhoz mentality” still prevails. Christopher puts special emphasis on ensuring a free press since the [Yeltsin] order banning opposition newspapers was still not lifted. Kozyrev does not have a definitive answer to the question regarding banned newspapers and he says only six or seven political organizations will be banned from participating in the elections.
In this memo about the Kozyrev meeting, Christopher is very brief about the NATO discussion. He tells Kozyrev that the U.S. is sensitive to the Russian position and has developeda new proposal as a result: the Partnership for Peace (PFP), which would be open to all countries on an equal basis.
Christopher does not directly address Kozyrev’s concern about the decision regarding expansion, but,misleadingly, lets it sound as if PFP is the alternative [to NATO expansion] for the time being.
The rest of the conversation deals with crucial issues on which the United States needs Russian cooperation, such as support for Eduard Shevardnadze in Georgia and the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from Ukraine.”
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Added:
10/22/1993, “Document 10“
In this memo about the Kozyrev meeting, Christopher is very brief about the NATO discussion. He tells Kozyrev that the U.S. is sensitive to the Russian position and has developeda new proposal as a result: the Partnership for Peace (PFP), which would be open to all countries on an equal basis.
Christopher does not directly address Kozyrev’s concern about the decision regarding expansion, but,misleadingly, lets it sound as if PFP is the alternative [to NATO expansion] for the time being.
The rest of the conversation deals with crucial issues on which the United States needs Russian cooperation, such as support for Eduard Shevardnadze in Georgia and the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from Ukraine.”
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Added:
10/22/1993, “Document 10“
“Secretary Christopher’s Meeting with President Yeltsin, 10/22/1993, Moscow
Source: U.S. Department of State. Date/Case ID: 08 MAY 2000 200000982
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“Christopher is taken to Yeltsin’s country house, Zavidovo, for a meeting that lasts only 45 minutes….Christopher
offers technical assistance for the election and notes that “there are
already numbers of our experts here who could be helpful but we would like to assist in any way in which we could do so.” Essentially, Christopher lauds Yeltsin’s handling of the crisis and never raises any concerns mentioned in Collins’ cable (see Document 6, above) about irregularities in the electoral process or the nature of Yeltsin’s constitution.
At the end of the conversation they briefly touch on the sensitive question of NATO expansion. Christopher leaves Yeltsin with the impression that the Partnership for Peace is an alternative to expansion (see Document 8 in National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 621 [tk: Rinat, please add link]). Yeltsin is extremely pleased with everything Christopher says at the meeting. He concludes “by saying that he appreciated immensely President Clinton’s early continuing and extremely generous support and that he wanted to pass on his highest esteem for the President.”
At the end of the conversation they briefly touch on the sensitive question of NATO expansion. Christopher leaves Yeltsin with the impression that the Partnership for Peace is an alternative to expansion (see Document 8 in National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 621 [tk: Rinat, please add link]). Yeltsin is extremely pleased with everything Christopher says at the meeting. He concludes “by saying that he appreciated immensely President Clinton’s early continuing and extremely generous support and that he wanted to pass on his highest esteem for the President.”
Added: 10/4/18, “A Quarter Century after the Storming of the Russian White House,” By Svetlana Savranskaya, gwu.edu
“The Clinton administration at the time saw Yeltsin as the guarantor of Russia’s democratic transition and thus viewed the outcome of the crisis as a victory for democratic forces, however unfortunate the loss of life was. Many Russian democrats, however, considered the events of 1993 as the turning point from democracy to an increasingly paternalistic and autocratic rule by Yeltsin and his successor.”
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“The Clinton administration at the time saw Yeltsin as the guarantor of Russia’s democratic transition and thus viewed the outcome of the crisis as a victory for democratic forces, however unfortunate the loss of life was. Many Russian democrats, however, considered the events of 1993 as the turning point from democracy to an increasingly paternalistic and autocratic rule by Yeltsin and his successor.”
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