.
Yeltsin in 1995 and 1997 begged Bill Clinton not to let former Soviet Republics join NATO, “especially Ukraine:" “[O]ne thing is very important: enlargement should also not embrace the former Soviet republics. I cannot sign any agreement without such language. Especially Ukraine.” Knowing he wouldn’t get that, Yeltsin begged Bill Clinton for at least a “gentlemen’s agreement.” But Bill turned him down. In 1997, NATO invited “Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic to join.”…Yeltsin called it a “new form of encirclement.”
8/4/2018, “Bill and Boris: A Window Into a Most Important Post-Cold War Relationship," James Goldgeier (“Vol 1, Iss 4 Stable URL: http://doi.org/10.15781/T27M04M3M)
“In a three-hour meeting at the Kremlin on May 10, 1995, Yeltsin asked for a better understanding of what Clinton was doing on NATO enlargement
“because now I see nothing but humiliation for Russia if you proceed.
How do you think it looks to us if
one bloc continues to exist
while the Warsaw Pact has been abolished?”
He called it a “new form of encirclement” and repeated his plea to develop a new pan-European security architecture.
“You and I are heading for elections,” Yeltsin said. “The extremists and hardliners are exploiting this issue for their own purposes — on both sides. I am being attacked from both the right and the left on this. We need a common European space that provides for overall security. So let’s postpone any change in NATO until 1999 or 2000. … But for me to agree to the borders of NATO expanding toward those of Russia —
that would constitute a betrayal on my part of the Russian people.”
Instead, Yeltsin said in desperation, “Let’s say that Russia will give every state that wants to join NATO a guarantee that we won’t infringe on its security.”…
Clinton tied his approach to the [1995] Victory Day ceremony for which he had come to Moscow and the lessons of history. “Our goal is for the U.S. to stay in Europe and promote a unified, integrated Europe.” He was doing that, he said, by trying to make the Partnership for Peace important, keeping open the door to Russian NATO membership, creating a special NATO-Russia relationship, and ensuring that the NATO membership review process was a deliberate one. Clinton reminded Yeltsin of how this process had unfolded, that he had told Yeltsin in January 1994 that NATO was open to taking in new members, and that in December NATO had agreed to study how to do it. Responding to that study would take the first half of 1996, said Clinton. For Yeltsin, this time frame was vital, because, the Russian leader noted, “my position heading into the 1996 elections is not exactly brilliant.”
Clinton, however, had his own political concerns. He explained to Yeltsin that the Republicans [via their very weak candidate Bob Dole who had no chance of winning] were using NATO expansion in their effort to win over voters of Central European descent in Wisconsin, Illinois, and Ohio. He suggested to Yeltsin that they accept what each other needed to do politically. Yeltsin would not have to embrace expansion. Clinton would not say he was slowing down the process. And meanwhile Yeltsin should sign the documents for Russia to join the Partnership for Peace and to establish a NATO-Russian dialogue:
[Bill Clinton]: “So here is what I want to do. I’ve made it clear I’ll do nothing to accelerate NATO [before the 1996 election]. I’m trying to give you now, in this conversation, the reassurance you need. But we need to be careful that neither of us appears to capitulate. For you, that means you’re not going to embrace expansion; for me, it means no talk about slowing the process down or putting it on hold or anything like that.”
Then Clinton told Yeltsin to sign the two documents. Yeltsin asked again that NATO move forward only after his [1996] election. Clinton reiterated the timetable, trying to reassure Yeltsin that nothing concrete would happen until after the summer of 1996. Yeltsin said they should publicly say they discussed the issue, understood each other, and would discuss the issue further at their next meeting. Clinton responded, “Good. So join PFP.” Yeltsin agreed.30
A few months before the NATO leaders’ 1997 announcement in Madrid that the alliance
was inviting
Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic to join,
Yeltsin made one last effort to shape the future at a small meeting with Clinton in Helsinki on March 21. He opened by acknowledging the inevitable. “Our position has not changed,” Yeltsin said. “It remains a mistake for NATO to move eastward.
But I need to take steps to alleviate the
negative consequences of this for Russia.
I am prepared to enter into an agreement with NATO not because I want to but because it is a forced step. There is no other solution for today.”
Yeltsin sought a legally binding accord, signed by all 16 NATO members, that would make clear that NATO decisions would not be made “without taking into account the concerns or opinions of Russia.”
He also wanted assurance that no nuclear or conventional arms would move into
the new members’ territory,
“thus creating a new cordon sanitaire aimed at Russia.”
Then he put on the table what he most wanted. “[O]ne thing is very important: enlargement should also not embrace the former Soviet republics.
I cannot sign any agreement without such language.
Recognizing he was unlikely to receive this, he changed tack slightly,
“I propose that in the statement we could accept the fact that Russia has no claims on other countries. In fact, regarding the countries of the former Soviet Union, let us have a verbal, gentlemen’s agreement — we would not write it down in the statement — that no former Soviet republics would enter NATO. This gentlemen’s agreement would not be made public.”
Clinton responded that he was “trying to change NATO.” He had language in the proposed agreement between NATO and Russia on nuclear and conventional forces. And he wanted to make sure they signed something before the NATO summit “so we can say to the world that there is a new NATO and a new Russia and that’s the right spirit,” to which Yeltsin agreed. But Clinton added that he couldn’t make an agreement on former Soviet republics: “it would be a bad thing for our attempt to build a new NATO,but it would also be a bad thing for your attempt to build a new Russia.” NATO was assisting the process of building an “integrated, undivided Europe,”
Clinton argued what Yeltsin was proposing
would mean “Russia would be saying,
‘we have still got an empire, but it just can’t reach as far West.’”
Clinton didn’t want to come out of the meeting having discussed new lines being drawn in Europe, and he wouldn’t be able to go forward with a treaty because of Senate opposition.
Yeltsin tried again, saying that the Duma would likely make this a condition of its ratification of a NATO-Russia charter. He asked Clinton to tell him what he wanted to hear “one-on-one —
without even our closest aides present —
that you won’t take new republics [into NATO] in the near future; I need to hear that.
I understand that maybe in ten years or something, the situation might change, but not now.”
Clinton shot back,
“If I went into a closet with you and told you that, the Congress would find out and pass a resolution invalidating the NATO-Russia charter. I’d rather frankly that the Duma pass a resolution conditioning its adherence on this point. I just can’t do it. A private commitment would be the same as a public one.…I know what a terrible problem this is for you, but
I can’t make the specific commitment you are asking for. It would violate the whole spirit of NATO.”
Yeltsin tried one last time to get what he wanted, but to no avail, and so they moved on to other items. 31…
The Clinton Presidential Library in July [2018] posted online nearly all of the declassified memoranda of conversation (“memcons”) from the in-person meetings and telephone conversations (“telcons”) between President Bill Clinton and Russian President Boris Yeltsin from Jan. 23, 1993, to Dec. 31, 1999, when Yeltsin abruptly resigned from office and made way for Putin. With 18 memcons and 56 telcons available through the library’s website, it is possible to view directly the key discussions between these two leaders over time, from the early days when Clinton publicly backed Yeltsin in his bloody political standoff with the Russian parliament to their later disagreements over NATO enlargement and Kosovo, along with numerous conversations about arms control, Chechnya, Iran, and other global issues.1…
Perhaps most important when their interactions are compared with those of other U.S. and Soviet (and later Russian) heads of state during the Cold War and after,
an enormous power differential existed between the two countries
in this period and
was the backdrop to their conversations.
Yeltsin’s Russia was extremely weak, a country in economic free-fall
and strategic decline.
Clinton’s America was enjoying its unipolar moment.3
In no other era before or since has the Russian president been in such a weak position when meeting with his American counterpart, and the declassified memcons and telcons from this period show how
that imbalance of power permeates the discussions.
The meetings largely consist of Yeltsin agreeing to Clinton’s requests after some back and forth. But also clear is
Yeltsin’s desire for Russia to be seen as an equal to the United States,
something that was important for his predecessors and successors alike and
a factor in U.S.-Russian relations
often underappreciated by many in the West.
Clinton’s Support for Yeltsin and the Building of a Personal Rapport
In his first term, Boris Yeltsin needed Bill Clinton’s support as he battled domestic Russian opposition to his policies. It was not just financial support for Russia that was critical, although that assistance was important, including when
Clinton publicly endorsed what became a $10.2 billion loan from the International Monetary Fund announced in the midst of the 1996 Russian presidential campaign.4 Clinton also offered Yeltsin complete public support when the latter used
military force in a standoff with the Russian parliament in the fall of 1993.
Clinton did so because he believed he needed Yeltsin — a Russian president committed to good relations with the West who could
thereby enable the American president
to shrink the U.S. defense budget
to pay for cherished domestic programs….
In the run-up to the first round of the Russian presidential election in June 1996, Yeltsin was growing desperate for financial assistance. He told the U.S. president, “Bill, for my election campaign, I urgently need for Russia a loan of $2.5 billion.” Yeltsin explained that he was not seeing results yet from the rescheduling of Russia’s debt by the group of major creditor countries known as the Paris Club, and the bulk of the recently announced IMF loan would not arrive until later in the year. “But the problem,” said Yeltsin, “is I need money to pay pensions and wages.” Clinton assured him, “I’ll check on this with the IMF and some of our friends and see what can be done.”10…
The greatest test of their personal relationship came during the
Kosovo bombing campaign in March 1999.
Clinton and his European counterparts
believed that NATO needed to carry out airstrikes against Serbia to bring its leader, Slobodan Milosevic, to the bargaining table.
Yeltsin was stridently opposed to any use of force, not just because of the close ties between Russia and Serbia
but partly because, unlike the situation in Bosnia a few years earlier,
this would mean military intervention in the internal affairs
of a sovereign country.
Russia’s ability to wield a veto in the U.N. Security Council meant that authorization for the war from that body would not be forthcoming.13
In a phone conversation between the two men as NATO was about to launch airstrikes, Clinton, after rehashing all that Milosevic had done, told Yeltsin bluntly, “Basically, it will be your decision if you decide to let this bully destroy the relationship we worked hard for over six and a half years to build up.” He reminded Yeltsin of all his public and private support over the years, including providing economic assistance to Russia and his multiple visits to Moscow. “You may decide to let this get in the way of our relationship, but I’m not going to because I do not think he’s that important. I’m sorry he is a Serb. I wish he were Irish or something else, but he is not.” Clinton tried telling Yeltsin that maybe after a few strikes, Milosevic would seek diplomacy; after all, he had come to the table in 1995 to end the earlier Balkan war.
Yeltsin would have none of it: “[O]ur people will certainly from now have a bad attitude with regard to America and with NATO. I remember how difficult it was for me
to try and turn the heads of our people, the heads of the politicians towards the West,
towards the United States,
but I succeeded in doing that,
Well, since I failed to convince the President, that means there is in store for us a very difficult, difficult road of contacts, if they prove to be possible.” He signed off with “Goodbye,” with no added embrace.14…
The Imbalance of Power and Russia’s Drive for Equal Status
Yeltsin’s desire to be seen as an equal, and Clinton’s efforts to provide window dressing to help with appearances, permeated their conversations throughout the two presidents’ time in office, and not only during their conversations over NATO enlargement.
During the September 1994 Washington summit,
Yeltsin said,
“[T]here are some people in the White House and Congress
who believe that Russia has lost its superpower status. Of course, not you personally, Bill.”
Clinton responded, “I have tried in every way to relate to Russia and to you as a great power and to enhance your role, whether in the G-7 or bilaterally.”33
Still, neither could escape the fact that the two countries occupied completely different status levels in the international system.
At their May 1995 meeting in Moscow, Clinton said to Yeltsin,
“You have to walk through the doors that we open for you.”34
The Russians wanted to be treated as equals, and
the idea of walking through doors the United States was opening for them
made clear that they were not….
Reading these memcons and telcons as a narrative record of the seven years of interactions between Clinton and Yeltsin left me feeling rather sad.
The two leaders certainly accomplished a great deal:
Yeltsin ensured that Russian troops left the Baltic countries,
worked to keep Russian entities from transferring missile technologies to Iran,
and participated in the Implementation Force in Bosnia alongside NATO and under American command….
It is notable that many of their accomplishments occurred during their first terms and were largely issues related to the collapse of the Soviet Union such as the removal of Russian troops from the Baltics and the stationing of strategic nuclear weapons. They had big plans throughout their two terms for new arms-control agreements, but domestic political constraints got in the way.
Ultimately, neither the United States nor Russia found a place for Russia in the basic architecture of European security.…
In September 1999, Yeltsin informed Clinton by phone,
It took me a lot of time to think who might be the next Russian president in the year 2000. Unfortunately, at that time, I could not find any sitting candidate. Finally, I came across him, that is, Putin, and I explored his bio, his interests, his acquaintances, and so on and so forth. I found out he is a solid man who is kept well abreast of various subjects under his purview. At the same time, he is thorough and strong, very sociable. And he can easily have good relations and contact with people who are his partners. I am sure you will find him to be a highly qualified partner. I am very much convinced that he will be supported as a candidate in the year 2000.41
In their in-person conversation in Istanbul in November 1999, Clinton asked who was going to win the Russian presidential election the next year, and Yeltsin did not hesitate: “Putin, of course. He will be the successor to Boris Yeltsin. He’s a democrat, and he knows the West.” He added, “He’s tough. He has an internal ramrod. He’s tough internally, and I will do everything possible for him to win — legally, of course. And he will win. You’ll do business together. He will continue the Yeltsin line on democracy and economics and widen Russia’s contacts. He has the energy and the brains to succeed.”42
On Dec. 31, 1999, Clinton called Yeltsin just after Yeltsin’s announcement that he was stepping down in favor of Putin, who of course went on to win the presidential election a few months later. In that final call, Clinton said, “You have guided your country through a historic time and you are leaving a legacy that will leave Russians better off for years to come….Boris, I believe that historians will say you were the father of Russian democracy…”
After telling Clinton once again that Putin would win and that he was a strong, intelligent democrat, Yeltsin ended their call as he had done so often over the previous seven years: “I would like from the bottom of my heart to embrace you.””43
“James Goldgeier is a professor of international relations at American University, visiting senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, and the 2018-19 Library of Congress chair in U.S.-Russia relations at the John W. Kluge Center. You can follow him on Twitter: @JimGoldgeier.”
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